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LOST CHANCE IN ILLINOIS?
THAT MAY STILL BE THE CASE.
LISA PETRILLI*

I.

INTRODUCTION

You, an average juror with no legal background, have just
ended two and a half weeks of testimony regarding a very complex
issue in a medical malpractice case. You know that the end is
near, and you can return to your life because the attorneys have
just given their closing arguments. You think all that is left is
decision of either guilty or not guilty, but then the judge starts to
read a long list of what sounds to you like rules. You find out that
this is not a matter of guilt or innocence and instead of one issue to
decide, you have three or four. The more instructions the judge
reads, the more confused you get about what should be the end
result. Phrases like "standard of care" and "proximate cause" cloud
what was once a crystal decision. Then, the twelve of you are told
that you are on your own to make sense of the extensive testimony
and instructions from the judge. You think to yourself, "I really
hope someone knows what is going on because I am lost."
Illinois recognizes many theories of action in medical
malpractice cases, including the doctrine of lost chance. Despite
the variety of theories, Illinois courts consistently limit jury
instructions to the available pattern jury instructions. These
pattern instructions, while technically adequate, fail to address
the specifics of the doctrine of lost chance. The pattern instructions
confuse the jury, rather than helping them understand the
theories they have just heard. Thus, these juries tend to find in
favor of the defendant, rather than the lost chance plaintiff.
Part I of this comment gives a brief introduction to the loss of
chance doctrine in Illinois medical malpractice cases. Part I also
gives a history of the use of pattern jury instructions in Illinois.
. J.D. Candidate, 2003; B.A. Political Studies, The University of Illinois
at Springfield, 1999. The author wishes to thank Alex de Saint Phalle for the
idea for this comment, The John Marshall Law Review Board for editorial
assistance and guidance, and Mary and Mark Petrilli, Alana Downen, George
Petrilli, Gladys Morgan, Sarah Sallee and Gina Pecoraro for their constant
love and support. This article is dedicated with love to my son Anthony, for
without him I would not have had the motivation to accomplish all that I have.
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Part II explores and compares the use of loss of chance jury
instructions in Illinois with states that recognize the doctrine of
lost chance and the use of a specific jury instruction. Part III
proposes a pattern jury instruction to use in Illinois loss of chance
cases.
II.

THE HISTORY OF "LOSS OF CHANCE" IN ILLINOIS

A. History of "Loss of Chance" in Illinois
1. Medical Malpractice Generally
In order to have a medical negligence claim in Illinois, the
plaintiff must show that the doctor had a duty, that the doctor
breached that duty, and that the breach proximately caused the
plaintiffs injury.' Proximate cause is made up of two separate and
distinct elements.! The plaintiff must first show that the breach of
duty was the legal cause of the plaintiffs injury.' A reasonably
foreseeable injury is the basis for legal cause in medical
malpractice claims.4 Generally, policy considerations dictate when
courts extend liability.5 The second part of proximate cause is
cause in fact. Cause in fact shows that the defendant's negligence
caused the plaintiffs injury to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty.6 The cause in fact element of proximate cause is at issue
in "loss of chance" cases.'
1. See Holton v. Mem'l Hosp., 679 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (Ill. 1997)
(establishing the general elements of medical negligence without reference to
loss of chance). In Illinois medical malpractice negligence refers to duty and
breach, and proximate cause refers to both cause in fact and legal cause. See
Christopher White, A Survey of Illinois Medical MalpracticeLaw, 24 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 935, 957-58 (2000) (setting forth that the doctrine of lost chance is an
available action in Illinois).
2. White, supra note 1, at 957. Proximate cause in Illinois refers to the
general causation element of negligence. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209. Legal
cause in Illinois is what is commonly known as proximate cause. See generally
Henry v. McKechnie, 698 N.E.2d 696 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (reiterating the
reasoning and holding of Holton).
3. White, supra note 1 at 957; Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206. Legal cause is
the element of causation that relates to the foreseeability of the breach as the
cause of the injury. See generally Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 699-702.
4. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206. See also White, supra note 1, at 957-58
(outlining the basics of medical negligence and briefly discussing each
individual element).
5. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206. The Holton court discussed the role of
proximate cause as it relates to loss of chance. Id.
6. Id. The court explained the general elements of medical negligence and
broke causation into two elements. Id.
7. See generally Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206-13; Lambie v. Schneider, 713
N.E.2d 603, 608-610 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1999); Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 699702 (applying the lost chance doctrine that relaxes causation where the
plaintiff experiences a lost chance of survival or effective treatment as a result
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In order to prove cause in fact, a plaintiff must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's breach caused
the plaintiffs injury.8 The doctrine of lost chance arises in cases
where the injury that the plaintiff complained of was not the
condition that took him to the doctor, rather the loss of an
opportunity to receive effective treatment from a condition that
the doctor failed to discover. 9 Thus, cause in fact becomes
impossible to show if the condition that the plaintiff was originally
suffering from caused him to have a less than a fifty percent
chance of survival."0 Since the plaintiff must prove the elements of
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that it is
more likely than not that the defendant committed negligence, the
plaintiff would also have to show the chance of survival by a
preponderance of the evidence. Prior to the lost chance doctrine,
the outcome was that the plaintiff, who would likely die prior to
the defendant's negligence, would not recover, whereas a plaintiff
who was more likely to survive prior to the negligence would have
a cause of action. This would be true in cases where the action by
the defendant doctor was the same. To deal with this inequality in
outcomes, Illinois adopted the lost chance doctrine.
2. Loss of Chance and Proximate Cause
In 1997 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized the lost chance
doctrine in Holton v. Memorial Hospital."' The doctrine flowed

of a doctor's negligence). See White, supra note 1, at 957-58 (summarizing the

elements of medical negligence and identifying the issue in lost chance cases
as cause in fact).
8. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206. See White supra note 1, at 957-58
(establishing the elements of medical negligence).
9. See Meck v. Paramedic Serv. of Ill., 695 N.E.2d 1321, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (stating that the plaintiff is not claiming that the defendant caused the
plaintiff to have a heart attack, but that the defendant lessened the
effectiveness of possible treatment options to prevent further damage as a
result of the heart attack). Once shown that the defendant's negligence caused
the decrease of the chance of survival of lessening of effective treatment, the
plaintiff must show that the plaintiff actually sustained harm. Id. at 1326. The
question regarding whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiffs injury is one for the jury. Id. (citing Chambers
v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Cent., 508 N.E.2d 426, 429-31 (Ill. App.

Ct. 1987)).
10. Id. at 1325-26.
11. See Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1202 (recognizing a cause of action for loss of
chance, which relaxes the proximate cause element so that the plaintiff need
not show that her chance of survival prior to the defendant's negligence would
have been greater than fifty percent). Prior to 1997 and the Holton decision,
Illinois courts required the plaintiff to prove each element by a preponderance
of the evidence, which meant that the plaintiff would have to show that her
chance of survival or a better outcome was more than fifty percent, or a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1206-13.
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from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 323.12 In Holton,
the court held that a plaintiff may recover damages provided he or
she can show-by a preponderance of evidence-that the
defendant either: 1) negligently lessened the effectiveness of
treatment causing loss of chance of survival; or 2) increased the
risk of a worse outcome even where the chance of survival of a
person with a condition similar to the plaintiffs was less than fifty
percent prior to the defendant's negligent actions.
B. Pattern Jury Instructionsin Illinois
Illinois requires that courts give pattern instructions to juries
wherever they are applicable. 4 In Illinois, a party has the right to
be heard on his or her theory of the case. 5 While a trial court is to
instruct the jury on all the issues, the instructions should not
mislead or confuse the jury. Illinois courts require parties to use
Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) where applicable. 6 Where the
instructions are applicable, courts refuse to allow a party to read

12. Meck, 695 N.E.2d at 1325 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 323 (1965) [hereinafter section 323]). Section 323 states:
One who undertakes ... to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person ... is
subject to liability to the other for the physical harm ... from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if (a) his failure
to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 323(a) (1965).
This section was first applied in Northern Trust Co. v. Louis A. Weiss
Mem'l Hosp., 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Meck, 695 N.E. at 1325-26. The
court in Northern Trust Co. suggested that evidence tending to show negligent
delay in diagnosis or lessened effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to
establish proximate cause. Northern Trust Co., 493 N.E.2d at 11.
13. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1213. Until 1997, the Illinois district courts had
been deeply divided as to the application of the loss of chance doctrine in
certain medical malpractice cases. Several cases in Illinois recognized a cause
of action for loss of chance. See generally Northern Trust, 493 N.E.2d 6, 11-16;
Chambers, 508 N.E.2d at 429-33; Pumala v. Sipos, 517 N.E.2d 295, 298-99 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); Hajian v. Holy Family Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1132, 1136-39 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995). However, many Illinois courts refuse to recognize a cause of
action for loss of chance when the plaintiff cannot prove that the chance of
survival would have been greater than fifty percent. See generally Hare v.
Foster G. McGaw Hosp., 549 N.E.2d 778, 781-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Netto v.
Goldenberg, 640 N.E.2d 948, 953-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
14. See generally Preston v. Simmons, 747 N.E.2d 1059, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (stating generally that where a pattern jury instruction is applicable,
the use of a non-pattern instruction is improper).
15. See generally LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 706 N.E.2d 441, 446-58 (Ill.
1998); Wille v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 584 N.E.2d 425, 429-31 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (stating that each party has the right to inform the jury as to
applicable legal theories that the parties can use to prove their case).
16. See generally Irwin v. Omar Bakeries, Inc., 198 N.E.2d 700, 703-05 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1964).
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non-pattern instructions to the jury."
Even where a non-pattern instruction accurately reflects state
law, courts refuse the instruction if an IPI exists on the same
issue." The categorical rejection of non-IPI instructions presents a
problem for parties seeking to use the new lost chance doctrine,
especially since the courts entitle parties to a jury instruction on
an issue when the issue is supported by some evidence in the
record. 9 While standard proximate cause instructions are
adequate, they are still confusing to the jury. Standard proximate
cause instructions lead the jury to believe that the plaintiff must
establish the increased risk to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty. However, the plaintiff need only establish to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the negligence of the
defendant caused any increased risk. °
C. "Lost Chance"Instructions in Illinois
Following Holton, many parties set forth jury instructions
specifically relating to the doctrine of lost chance.21 The IPI for
juries do not contain an instruction for loss of chance." Since
Illinois courts do not generally admit non-IPI instructions,
plaintiffs instead begrudgingly accept the standard instruction for
proximate cause.
For example, in Lambie v. Schneider, doctors diagnosed a
young child with a heart defect.24 The child underwent surgery to
17. Id.; see generally James A. Dooley, Illinois Pattern Instructions: An
Appraisal by a Plaintiffs Attorney, 1963 U. OF ILL. LAW FORUM 586 (1963)
(setting forth that courts prefer pattern jury instructions because, by design,
they simplify the law for juries).
18. Erikson v. Muskin Corp., 535 N.E.2d 475, 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
19. Demos v. Ferris-Shell Oil, Co., 740 N.E.2d 9, 21 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
20. See generally Philip H. Corboy, Pattern Jury Instructions-Their
Function and Effectiveness, 32 INSURANCE COUNCIL J. 57 (1965).
21. See generally Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 699-702; Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 60810; Sinclair v. Berlin, 758 N.E.2d 442, 447-50 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (illustrating
cases where the plaintiff requested a jury instruction specifically dealing with
loss of chance and the relaxed form of proximate cause). See also Jennifer
Deitchman, Case Note, Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois: Proximate
Cause and the Lost Chance Doctrine in Illinois 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
241, 242 (stating that Illinois courts must apply the lost chance standard in
certain cases that would otherwise be very difficult to prove).
22. See cases cited supra note 12 (proposing instructions for loss of chance
because the IPI instructions do not contain an instruction for loss of chance).
23. See Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701 (stating that parties are entitled to have
the jury instructed as to the law governing the case, but departure from IPI
instructions requires careful scrutiny and only used when necessary to provide
a fair trial even if the instruction accurately states the law of the case). See
also Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608; Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 448-49 (reiterating
the court's view in Henry).
24. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 605-06. The child in Lambie was born with
respiratory distress, and within days developed a heart murmur. Id. at 605.
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repair the defect to the left side of her heart.2" During the surgery,
the doctor could not locate the cause of the problems with the left
side of the child's heart and placed bands on her arteries.26
Following the surgery the child suffered severe right heart and
nerve damage.2 7 The plaintiff brought action claiming that
although the doctor may not have been able to repair the damage
to the left side of the heart during the procedure, the doctor's
negligence was the cause of the damage to the right side of the
heart and the nerve damage.2 ' The plaintiff claimed that the
doctor's negligence caused the child to remain disordered and
reduced the effectiveness of treatment.29
The plaintiff proposed a jury instruction on loss of chance.
The plaintiff based the instruction on a section of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and provided:
A physician who undertakes to render services to a patient
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the patient is subject to liability to the patient for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his medical services, if his failure to exercise such
care increases the risk of such harm.3 °
The court rejected this instruction for two reasons. First, the
court believed that the proposed instruction would cause
unnecessary confusion." Second, the court stated that the
The child was diagnosed as having congestive heart failure and later with
"truncus arteriosus, a condition where the blood vessels carrying the blood to
the body merges with the blood vessels carrying blood to the lungs." Id. at 60506.
25. Id. at 605.
26. Id. at 606.
27. Id. The child suffered from severe right heart failure with abnormal
PDA or AP window and phrenic nerve damage following the defendant's
operation on the child. Id.
28. Id. It was the child's contention that the permanent damage resulted
from the surgery performed by the defendant. Id. The plaintiff charged that
the child suffered from mild left heart damage prior to the surgery and severe
right side damage and nerve damage following the negligent performance of
surgery. Id.
29. Id. The plaintiffs cause of action alleged the defendant's negligence
proximately caused the child to suffer unnecessary pain and suffering and to
remain disordered and weakened. Id. at 607.
30. Id. The plaintiffs cause of action alleged that the defendant's negligence
was the proximate cause of the child's sufferance of unnecessary pain. Id. For
the text of the Restatement, see section 323, supra note 12.
31. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608. The court found that the non-pattern jury
instruction would cause unnecessary confusion for the jury. Id. Coincidentally,
the plaintiff in Lambie cited to Henry. The plaintiff noted the following
language from Henry:
In cases discussing jury instructions on the lost chance doctrine, the
courts have variously required a finding of probability of causation, a
finding of substantial possibility of a better result, language based on
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standard jury instruction for proximate cause was sufficient.32

The Lambie court relied on the decision in Henry v.
McKechnie.33 In Henry, the plaintiff submitted a jury instruction
based upon the same Restatement section relied upon in Lambie.34
The instruction stated that "[a] person who undertakes to render
services to another is liable for physical harm resulting from his
failure to exercise reasonable care if that failure increased their
risk of harm."" The court rejected the instruction and found that
juries should only receive non-IPI instructions if the standard
instructions are inadequate.36 Furthermore, the court in both
Lambie and Henry found that instructions based on section 323 of
the Restatement of Torts may have instructed the jury as to cause
in fact but failed to instruct the jury as to proximate cause.37
The most recent Illinois case specifically dealing with jury
instructions for loss of chance is Sinclair v. Berlin,38 recently
decided in September 2001. 39 In Sinclair, the plaintiff had
section 323 of the Restatement (second) [sic] of Torts, or modifying the
substantial factors formula for causation.
Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608. (citing Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701).
32. Id. The court found that the plaintiff misread the court in Henry and
that the use of a specific instruction for loss of chance will only confuse the
jury as to the relevant substantive law of Illinois. Id.
33. Id. The Lambie court cited Henry and found that the court in Henry
rejected jury instructions based on section 323. Id. The court in Lambie also
based its reasoning on a pre-Holton decision in Curry v. Summer, 483 N.E.2d
711 (1985). Id.
34. Id. at 609. The court stated that although the plaintiff attempted to
distinguish the instruction in Lambie from the instruction in Henry, both
instructions contain the same language from section 323. Id. The plaintiff in
Lambie further argued that long form instruction given did not accurately
inform the jury as to the applicable law, and since the short form IPI dealing
with proximate cause was given in Henry and the long form at trial in this
case, the court should distinguish between Henry and Lambie. Id.
35. Henry, 698 N.E. 2d at 698 (quoting the full language of the instruction
that the plaintiff proposed). The jury instruction in Henry was identical to the
instruction tendered in Curry. See also, Curry, 483 N.E.2d at 717-18. Curry
was a pre-Holton case where the plaintiff attempted to use the loss of chance
doctrine and the court rejected the doctrine and the proposed instruction that
the plaintiff offered. Id. at 717-18.
36. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608; Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701. Though litigants
are entitled to have the jury instructed about their theory of the case, IPI
instructions will be used when applicable. Id. The instructions are to be used
to adequately instruct the jury and if the instructions are adequate, non-IPI
instructions that correctly state the law of the case will not be used. Id.
37. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 609; Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701-02. Both courts
found that section 323 was misleading and failed to accurately state Illinois
law. Id. The reason that both courts used for the inadequacy of the instruction
based on section 323 was that it indicated that a defendant may be found
liable for any increased risk resulting from his conduct, regardless of whether
the increased risk was foreseeable. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608.
38. 758 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
39. Sinclair is the first First Judicial Circuit decision relating to a jury
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complaints of pain in her eye.4" The plaintiff claimed she visited
the defendant's office and called on several occasions.41 The
plaintiffs vision gradually weakened and eventually lead to

blindness.4'2 The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's negligent
failure to diagnose and treat her eye condition caused a worsening

of her condition until she completely lost vision.43 In essence, the
defendant's negligence caused a lost chance of effective
treatment.44
Again, the plaintiff introduced a non-pattern jury instruction
on the lost chance doctrine. 5 The plaintiff contended that if the
jury was not specifically instructed on the doctrine of lost chance,
the jury would not know what to do with the lost chance evidence
introduced at trial. The proposed instruction in Sinclair7 differed
from the instructions rejected in both Henry"' and Lambie.4 9 The
instruction stated that "[piroximate causation may be established
by proving or showing that [the] Defendant's conduct increased the
risk of harm to the plaintiff, or lessened the effectiveness of the
plaintiffs treatment.""0 The court refused to allow the instruction,
citing both Henry and Lambie."' However, in Sinclair the court

instruction for loss of chance. See generally Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d 442. Henry
and Lambie were both Fourth Judicial Circuit cases. See generally Lambie,
713 N.E.2d at 603; Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 696.
40. Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 445. The plaintiff suffered from a cataract
condition as diagnosed by the defendant. Id.
41. Id. at 445-46.
42. Id. at 446.
43. Id. The plaintiff alleged that she repeatedly came to the defendant's
office for follow-up visits, but that the doctor still failed to treat her vision
condition. Id. The plaintiff claimed that she went to the doctor's office on
several occasions complaining of eye pain, dryness, black floaters and bubbles
in her eye. Id. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendant's failure to
examine and treat her resulted in complete legal blindness in her right eye. Id.
44. Id. at 446-47. The plaintiff underwent three surgeries in an attempt to
repair the damage to her right eye, but all three surgeries failed to correct her
vision. Id. at 446.
45. Id. at 448. The plaintiff contended that she was entitled to an
instruction for loss of chance in light of the Illinois Supreme Courts holding in
Holton. Id.
46. Id. at 449. The plaintiff introduced evidence of the doctor's failure to
diagnose and treat her condition, but never claimed or produced any evidence
that the doctor caused the cataract. Id. at 446.
47. Id. at 449.
48. Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 698.
49. Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608.
50. Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 449. The plaintiffs instruction differed from the
Henry and Lambie instructions in that it was not derived from section 323, but
from the decision in Holton. Id. The instruction was based upon the language
in Holton that defined loss of chance in medical malpractice actions. Id.;
Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209.
51. Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 449. The court rejected the plaintiffs proposed
instruction and instead gave the long-form instruction on proximate cause to
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found that the instruction properly instructed the jury on Illinois
law, but was unnecessary. 2 The court found, as in Henry and
Lambie, that the IPI instructions on proximate cause were
adequate.53
In Illinois, a party seeking to introduce a non-IPI instruction
must meet a high burden. Under Supreme Court Rule 239(a), IPI
instructions are given deference over non-IPI instructions, even if
the non-IPI accurately reflects the current state of the law. 54 If IPI
instructions adequately instruct the jury on the applicable law of a
case, the court views the non-IPI instructions as unnecessary. 55
The lost chance doctrine in Illinois is a recent development
that relaxed the cause in fact element of causation in certain
medical malpractice cases. In the three cases where a loss of
chance jury instruction was proposed and denied, the court found

the jury. Id. The trial judge decided to give IPI Civil 3d No. 15.01 that states:
When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. It need
not be the only cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it
concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which in
combination with it, causes the injury.
Id. at 449.
52. Id. The court stated that although the plaintiffs instruction accurately
states the law in lost chance medical malpractice cases, the trial court is
required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a) to use the IPI wherever
applicable. Id. See also Snelson v. Kamm, 745 N.E.2d 128, 150-51 (Ill. App. Ct.
2001) (citing the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239). Supreme Court Rule 239(a)
provides:
Whenever the Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) contains an instruction
applicable in a civil case, giving due consideration to the facts and the
prevailing law, and the court determines that the jury should be
instructed on the subject, the IPI instruction shall be used, unless the
court determines that it does not accurately state the law.
ILL S. CT. R. 239(a).
53. Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 449-50. See also, Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701;
Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608 (stating that non-IPI instructions will not be used
when an adequate IPI instruction does exist).
54. Snelson, 745 N.E.2d at 151; Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 449. According to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a) and the interpretation of the rule, the trial
court should not "tinker" with IPI instructions. ILL S. CT. R. 239(a). The court
in Snelson further stated that the trial court's inquiry should be limited to
following three questions: (1) whether there is an instruction on a particular
area of law is appropriate or necessary; (2) whether there is a pattern
instruction on point; and (3) whether the IPI accurately states the law.
Snelson, 745 N.E.2d at 151..
55. People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 126, 143
(Ill. 2000) (citing People v.
Haywood, 413 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1980)). The court in Haywood stated:
Instructions found in IPI were drafted with the goal of sharply reducing
the number of cases in which jury verdicts were set aside because of
erroneous
instructions.
Consequently,
each
instruction
was
painstakingly drafted with the use of simple, brief and unslanted
language so as to clearly and concisely state the law.
Haywood, 413 N.E.2d at 413.
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that the plaintiff satisfied the elements of a prima facie case of
medical negligence using a loss of chance theory.56 However, in
each case, the court deemed the loss of chance instruction as
unnecessary. 7 In each case, the jury received the standard
instruction on proximate cause and in each case the plaintiff was
denied recovery."
Illinois courts allow non-IPI instructions where the IPI
instructions do not adequately inform the jury on the applicable
Illinois law. The IPI lacks a specific instruction on the lost chance
doctrine, so it seems only logical that courts should allow a
plaintiff to use a non-IPI instruction in lost chance cases.59 Since
the courts forbid the use of non-IPI instructions in lost chance
cases simply because they are non-IPI instructions, there is a need
for an IPI on the lost chance doctrine.
III.

USE OF LOSS OF CHANCE JURY INSTRUCTION IN STATES THAT
ALLOW THE INSTRUCTION

A. Pennsylvania
60

1.

The History of Hamil v. Bashline

In 1973 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly accepted
Section 323(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law in
Pennsylvania in Hamil v. Bashline.6 ' The plaintiff in Bashline I
alleged that the defendant doctor failed to diagnose and treat the
plaintiffs condition in a manner that may have prevented harm to

56. See generally Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1206-13; Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at
447-50; Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608-10; Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 699-702
(establishing that a cause of action for loss of chance exists and is applicable in
these cases).
57. Id. Each case holds that jury instructions for loss of chance are not
necessary unless an IPI does not adequately state the applicable Illinois law.
Id. In both Henry and Lambie, the court also found that the instruction based
upon section 323 did not accurately state the law of Illinois. See also Lambie,
713 N.E.2d at 608; Henry, 698 N.E.2d at 701 (stating that Illinois law still
applied traditional proximate cause standards).
58. See Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 447-50; Lambie, 713 N.E.2d at 608-10;
Henry, 698 N.E.2d 699-702 (stating that the outcome in each case is a denial of
the jury instruction on loss of chance, as well as upholding the denial of
recovery to the plaintiff).
59. See id. (citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a) that states that nonIPI instructions would not be given if not necessary, and where the IPI
instructions adequately state Illinois law).
60. 392 A.2d 1280, 1286 (Pa. 1978)
61. Bashline, 392 A.2d at 1286. The court in Bashline held that section 323
had been adopted in medical malpractice cases where the plaintiff had shown
the negligent non-performance increased the risk of harm. [Hereinafter
Bashline I].
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the plaintiff.62 The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of
the defendant. The Superior Court reversed, relying on section 323
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and granted a new trial."
The second trial (BashlineII) generally consisted of the same
testimony as the first trial." The jury found for the defendants and
the plaintiffs again appealed to the Superior Court." The plaintiffs
alleged that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury
and therefore failed to comply with the Superior Courts ruling in
Bashline 1.66 The Superior Court affirmed the entry of judgment for
the defendant without addressing the issue. 67 The plaintiff again
appealed (BashlineIII).6"
2. Holding of the Bashline Cases
Under section 323(a), a plaintiff may bring a claim on the
theory that the defendant's action or omission constituted a failure
to perform a duty to protect a person against harm from another
source. 9 In a case that falls within section 323(a), "a fact-finder

62. Id. at 1283. Mrs. Hamil called the defendant hospital just before
midnight on May 31, 1968. Id. She told the night supervisor that her husband
was suffering from severe chest pains. Id. The supervisor told Mrs. Hamil to
bring her husband to the Emergency Room. Id. When Mr. and Mrs. Hamil
arrived, the doctor assigned to the ER ordered an electrocardiogram (EKG) to
be taken. Id. The EKG machine failed and the doctor ordered the staff to find
another EKG machine, but another machine could not be found. Id. Mr. Hamil
received no further aid or treatment and Mrs. Hamil took her husband to a
private doctor. Id. Mr. Hamil died while the EKG was being taken at the
private office. Id. The cause of death was a myocardial infarction. Id. Mrs.
Hamil then brought a cause of action against numerous defendants, including
the hospital and doctor on duty in the Emergency room. Id. The complaint
alleged that the defendants failed to employ recognized and available methods
of treatment. Id.
63. Id. at 1283. The court found that plaintiff "had in fact established a
prima facie case of negligence therefore reversing the trial court and granting
a new trial." Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1283-84. Substantially, the same evidence was produced at both
trials. Id. "The jury returned a verdict for the defendant in the second trial
and by special interrogatories expressed its belief that although the defendant
acted in a negligent manner the plaintiff failed to establish that defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of the decedent's death." Id.
66. Id. at 1284.
67. Id. at 1284, n.3. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court felt the lower court
was mistaken in its grounds for reversal in Bashline I. Id. The divided court
consisted of three members who rejected the rationale in Bashline I and
concluded that the original directed verdict was correct. Id. Therefore, the
court concluded that any further error in the second trial was harmless. Id.
68. Id. at 1286. The court determined that the reason for the plaintiffs
appeal was to reassert the reasoning of the Superior Court in Bashline I. Id.
69. Id. The court found that section 323 is unlike the typical tort cause of
action where the plaintiff is alleging that the defendant set in motion the
events that caused the harm. Id.
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must consider what did occur as well as what might have
occurred."" Where a plaintiff can show how the injury happened
and also that the victim may have saved himself from death or
further injury by taking advantage of a precaution that the
defendant failed to afford, courts should let the jury decide
whether the doctor's failure caused the harm.7' When a defendant's
negligence has effectively eliminated a person's chance of survival,
the defendant cannot then say that he is not answerable for the
injury because the plaintiff cannot establish that the victim would
have survived to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 2 The
injury is the loss of the opportunity to live as the result of
defendant's negligence.
The court in Bashline III found that the plaintiff could
establish how the injury occurred.73 The court found that had the
victim been able to take advantage of a precaution not afforded to
him by some negligent act or omission of the defendants, he might
have survived.74 The Court also held where causation is the critical
issue as it was in Bashline II, a jury instruction relating to the
doctrine now known as loss of chance must be given to avoid
confusion.5

70. Id. at 1286-87. The court stated that the fact-finder should consider
whether decedent's death "would have occurred from an independent source
even if the defendant had performed the duty in a non-negligent manner." Id.
71. Id. at 1287. The court decided that the determination as to what might
have happened involved weighing probabilities and should be submitted to the
jury to determine if "it is more probable that the event was caused by the
defendant than that it was not." Id. (citing F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS, Vol. 2, § 20.2 at 1113 (1956)) (claiming that where a plaintiff can
show how an accident happened and also that the victim may have lived or
had a better outcome if offered a precaution that the defendant negligently
failed to afford, courts have generally let a jury find that failure caused the
harm even though it is speculative). A plaintiff cannot always positively
establish with medical certainty that the precaution would have helped. Id.
72. Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1968). The court
held that if there is any substantial possibility that the victim could have
survived and the defendant destroyed that possibility, then the defendant is
answerable even if it is not established with absolute certainty. Id.
73 Bashline, 392 A.2d at 1287-90.
74. See generally Bashline, 392 A.2d at 1287-90 (stating that the plaintiff
still had the burden of proving that the defendant had a duty that he breached
and that the breach caused the plaintiffs injury). Under section 323(a), the
plaintiff is not released from proving an element of medical malpractice. Id. at
1286. Bashline I provided the court with a chance to establish the importance
of section 323(a) because plaintiff had established a prima facie case for
negligence. Id. at 1289. The goal of adopting section 323(a) is to prevent
defendants in medical malpractice from escaping liability when a plaintiff
cannot establish that she would have not suffered the injury to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty. Id. at 1287-88.
75. See id. at 1289-90 (recognizing the importance of the loss of chance
doctrine as based upon section 323(a) and an applicable instruction). The court
found that even in situations where the instruction tendered to the jury
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Other PennsylvaniaCases

Numerous cases have cited the Bashline trilogy decisions, and
at least four Pennsylvania cases have found that where section
323(a) applies, the plaintiff is entitled to a corresponding
instruction on causation.6 In cases where the court refused the
instruction, higher courts reversed on the ground that refusing a
loss of chance instruction constitutes reversible error and abuse of
discretion by the trial court.77
8
a. Hoeke v. Mercy Hospital"

The plaintiffs in Hoeke filed a medical malpractice suit
against the defendants claiming that the victim sustained further
injury as a result of negligent care in the performance of an
operation and postoperative care.7 9 The defendants conceded that
section 32 3(a) applies and the issue became whether the
defendant's negligent failure to treat the condition caused the
victim's injury.8 ° The plaintiff introduced evidence that established
the defendant's negligence caused
an increased risk of leg
amputation and kidney removal.8
accurately stated the law, an instruction on "loss of chance" was necessary to
avoid confusion. Id.
76. Pennsylvania courts recognize that when a plaintiff establishes that the
defendant's acts or omissions in a section 323(a) situation have increased the
risk of harm, the evidence furnished by the plaintiff to establish this principle
goes to the fact finder. See generally Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920,
923-25 (Pa. 1981); Hoeke v. Mercy Hosp., 445 A.2d 140, 143-46 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982); Brozana v. Flanigan, 454 A.2d 1125, 1127-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983);
Clark v. Hoerner, 525 A.2d 377, 379-384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (upholding the
decision in Bashline I). In each case, traditional standards of a reasonable
degree of medical certainty still applied. See generally id. The prevailing
theory requires the plaintiff to establish to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the defendant's act or omission caused an increased risk of
harm. See generally id.
77. See generally id. (upholding the decision in Bashline I).
78. 445 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
79. Hoeke, 445 A.2d at 141. The plaintiff claims that she sustained the loss
of her right kidney and right leg as the result of the negligent performance of
an abdominal hysterectomy and negligent postoperative care. Id. Hoeke
originally sought treatment for excessive vaginal bleeding and pain. Id. at 142.
The defendant recommended the operation to alleviate the bleeding and pain.
Id. During the operation excessive bleeding occurred in the operative area. Id.
It was conceded that the bleeding was a result of the surgery. Id. Following
the surgery the blood supply to the victim's leg was diminished. Id. The
defendant left for vacation following the surgery and failed to notify his
associate of the victim's condition. Id. When the condition was finally detected,
the damage was irreversible and the leg was amputated. Id.
80. Id. at 143. Specifically the plaintiffs theory under section 323(a) was
that the defendant's failure to act caused the removal of the plaintiffs leg and
kidney. Id.
81. Id. The court found that a question of fact existed as to the issue of
whether the failure increased the risk and that the judge properly allowed the
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The plaintiff requested a jury instruction relating to section
323(a) and the instruction was allowed.8" The jury subsequently
found for the plaintiff and the defendant appealed, claiming that
the instruction in effect created a de facto directed a verdict for the
plaintiff.83 The Court disagreed and affirmed the decision stating
that instructions using section 323(a) language accurately state
Pennsylvania law, and courts will give the instruction when the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.84
b.

Clark v. Hoerner

Continuing with the reasoning in the Bashline line of cases,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Clark applied section 323(a)
and its corresponding jury instruction." In Clark, the plaintiff
claimed that the doctor acted in a negligent manner by failing to
diagnose the afflicting condition, and that if he had first diagnosed
the condition, she might have survived.86 The plaintiff requested a
section 323(a) instruction and the trial court allowed the
jury to decide the factual issue. Id. at 145-46.
82. Id. at 143. The instruction read as follows:
[W]hen a defendant physician negligently fails to act, or negligently
delays in employing indicated diagnostic or therapeutic measures, and
his negligence proximately causes injuries to his patient, the plaintiff
does not have to prove to a certainty that proper care would have, as a
medical fact, prevented the injuries in question. If a defendant
physician's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated his
patient's chances of avoiding injuries, he may not raise conjectures as to
the measure of the chances he has put beyond the possibility of
realization. If there was any substantial possibility of avoiding injuries
and the defendant has destroyed that possibility, he is liable to the
plaintiff.
Id.
83. Id. at 143-44. The court decided that the defendant's claim that the
instruction directed a verdict for the plaintiff was unfounded and the
instruction based on the Bashline decision was an accurate statement of the
law.
84. Id. at 143-45. (citing Bashline, 392 A.2d at 1288). The court further
stated that section 323(a) is recognized as the law in Pennsylvania. Id. at 143.
85. See generally Clark, 525 A.2d at 379-84 (holding that when section
323(a) applies, a fact finder can determine that the increased risk caused the
harm).
86. Id. at 378. In Clark, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survival
action against defendant doctor and hospital for negligently failing to diagnose
the child's condition that ultimately led to her death. Id. The child was
brought to the defendant on December 26, 1980 and he diagnosed the child as
having the flu. Id. The defendant prescribed antihistamines and Tylenol. Id.
On December 29th the girl was again brought to the defendant after
complaining of a sore throat and chest pains. Id. Again the defendant
diagnosed the condition as the flu and refused antibiotics. Id. at 378. The girl's
condition worsened and she began to vomit blood. Id. at 379. The girl's parents
took her to the emergency room and she was diagnosed with a rapidly
progressing fulminating pneumonia of the right lung. Id. She suffered kidney
and respiratory failure and ultimately died. Id.
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instruction.87 The jury ultimately found for the plaintiff, and the
defendant appealed, claiming that the instruction should have
been denied.88
The court found that where causation in medical malpractice
cases is at issue and brought within section 323(a), the task of
balancing the conflicting evidence is for the jury.89 In Clark, the
plaintiff established that section 323(a) applied. 0 The plaintiff also
presented evidence showing that the negligent act or omission
increased the risk of death, and therefore the court rightfully sent
the question of causation to the jury with a corresponding
instruction.91
B. Iowa
1.

DeBurkarte v. Louvar

2

In DeBurkarte, the Iowa Supreme Court decision affirmed a
jury verdict against the defendant in a medical malpractice action
using the lost chance theory. 3 The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant failed to diagnose the victim's cancer, and that this
failure to diagnose increased the risk of injury suffered by the
victim. 4 The jury found for the plaintiff and the defendant
87. Id. The court found that both sides presented conflicting evidence that
created a question of fact as to whether the risk of injury had been increased.
Id. at 380-81. The author believes that this is a perfect example of a situation
where the proposed instruction should be given. The court cited Bashline and
stated that once a plaintiff has established that the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions have increased the risk of harm to the victim the evidence should
then go to the fact finder. Id. at 379-80. Again, it is the author's contention
that in situations like this, a corresponding jury instruction should be given to
avoid confusion.
88. Id. at 379.
89. Id. at 380.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing D.Danner and E. Segall, Mediocolegal Causation:A source of
Profession Misunderstanding,3 AM.J.L. & MED. 303, 311 (1978)).
92. 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986).
93. DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 135. Prior to this decision, Iowa had not
decided a case based upon the doctrine of lost chance. Id. The court used
Deburkarte as the vehicle to establish loss of chance in Iowa. Id.
94. Id. at 132. In DeBurkarte, the Plaintiff claimed that the defendant
failed to detect cancer in the plaintiff and his negligence increased her risk of
injury. Id. The plaintiff detected a lump in her breast. Id. The defendant
ordered a mammogram and diagnosed the lump as a cyst. Id. The lump did
not go away and the victim returned to the defendant who reassured her that
the lump was a cyst. Id. Over the next nine months the victim returned to the
defendant nine times drawing the defendant's attention to the lump each time.
Id. The defendant repeatedly dismissed the lump as a cyst. Id. The defendant
was aware that the victim's family had a history of breast cancer. Id.
Furthermore, the defendant was aware that the lump was in an area of the
breast where most cancerous tumors are found. Id. The victim then found
another lump near her nipple and again went to the defendant who referred
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appealed.95 The defendant claimed that the plaintiff had failed to
prove causation and the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
on proximate cause."
For the first time, the court applied section 323(a) and found
that the plaintiffs injury was her loss of chance to survive the
cancer. 97 The court found that the jury was reasonable in finding
the defendant's failure to diagnose and treat the cancer as the
likely cause of a reduction in the plaintiffs chance to survive the
cancer. 9 Furthermore, the court found that the trial court did not
err in instructing the jury on doctrine of lost chance. 99
2. Sanders v. Ghristl°°
The plaintiff in Sanders appealed a verdict for the defendant
in a medical malpractice action, stating that the refusal of an
instruction on lost chance was erroneous.'0 ' The plaintiff brought
the action against a doctor who failed to diagnose and treat the
victim's tumor.' The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the trial
court's decision, and found that where the doctrine of lost chance
applies, failure to give a corresponding jury instruction constitutes
an abuse of discretion and amounts to reversible error. 10 3
In reaffirming the decision in DeBurkarte, the court stated
that parties are entitled have their legal theories submitted to the
jury.0 4 When a party establishes that the doctrine of lost chance
applies, the court shall allow that party to use a jury instruction

her to a surgeon. Id. The surgeon performed two procedures, a needle
aspiration and a biopsy of both lumps and determined that the lumps were
cancerous. Id. The victim had a mastectomy, however the cancer had spread to
her spine and leg. Id. The victim's ovaries were eventually removed and the
victim underwent chemotherapy. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 134. The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish
proximate cause to a reasonable degree of medical certainty thereby
necessitating a directed verdict for the defendant. Id. at 134-35.
97. Id. at 135. The court remarked that although the plaintiffs chance of
survival was less than fifty percent, the evidence established that the
defendant's negligence decreased the already low chance of survival. Id.
98. Id. at 136 (citing Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632).
99. Id. at 137. The court held that the plaintiffs tendered instruction using
the language of section 323(a) encompassed the loss of chance theory and
accurately defined proximate cause. Id. at 138.
100. 421 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1988).
101. Sanders, 421 N.W.2d at 521. The Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that the
trial court erred in refusing to give the plaintiffs loss of chance instruction
that was based upon section 323(a) and the DeBurkarte decision. Id. at 523.
102. Id. at 521. In Sanders, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant failed to
diagnose and treat a malignant tumor increasing the risk of the victim's
ultimate death. Id.
103. Id. at 523. (citing DeBurkarte).
104. Id. at 522.
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that corresponds to the doctrine. '°' To refuse the instruction would
effectively prevent the jury from hearing the offering party's
theory of the case.106
C. Montana
In addition, Montana recognizes the loss of chance doctrine.
The only case dealing with the issue of a jury instruction for loss of
chance is Aasheim v. Humberger.'°7 In Aasheim, the plaintiff told
the doctor that she was having many problems in her knee, but
the defendant doctor failed to accurately diagnose the condition as
a tumor that ultimately required the implantation of a prosthetic
knee device." 8 The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action
against the defendant, claiming that his failure to diagnose the
condition resulted in her losing a chance to save her knee."'
The jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed
claiming that the trial court erred in refusing her a jury
instruction on the doctrine of lost chance. 1 ' The Supreme Court of
Montana agreed with the plaintiff and found that the instruction
on legal cause given to the jury during the trial required that the
plaintiff prove a probability of greater than fifty percent that
earlier detection would have saved her knee."' Under the doctrine
of lost chance, the plaintiff need not show that the probability of
risk would be greater than fifty percent, but that the failure to
diagnose caused an increased risk."' Because the plaintiff had
already established that the doctrine of lost chance applied, the
trial court should give an instruction on the doctrine in order to
accurately reflect Montana law." 3
D. South Carolina
South Carolina recognizes a cause of action for the doctrine of
lost chance based upon section 323(a). In Sherer v. James, 4 the
court found that the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 825 (Mont. 1985).

108. Id., at 825.

The court determined that the defendant incorrectly

diagnosed the condition as chondromalacia. Id. When the plaintiffs condition

did not improve, she sought treatment from another doctor who correctly
diagnosed the condition as a giant cell tumor. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 827.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 828. The court found that where loss of chance is used, an
instruction must be given to reflect Montana law. Id. Montana law is based
upon section 323(a) and instructions using section 323(a)'s language should be
given where applicable. Id.
114. 334 S.E.2d 283 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
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in cases where the doctrine was applicable warranted reversal.11 '
The plaintiff in Sherer claimed that the negligent failure to
diagnose and treat the victim's condition resulted in an increased
risk of harm."6 The plaintiff requested an instruction on loss of
chance, but the trial court refused.117 The jury ultimately returned
a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.' 8
The only issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in
refusing the tendered instruction on the doctrine of lost of
chance."9 The court found that the trial courts instruction on legal
cause failed to adequately state the plaintiffs lost chance theory. 2 '
The court further found that where the plaintiff establishes that
the doctrine of lost chance applies prima facially,
the trial court
121
must give a corresponding jury instruction.
IV. PROPOSAL
In 1997, when the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the loss of
chance doctrine in Holton, the Supreme Court of Illinois relaxed
the burden of proximate cause to allow recovery in certain
situations where the plaintiff could not prove causation to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty.' Since the adoption of loss
of chance in Illinois, several plaintiffs have sought recovery using
the loss of chance doctrine.' 23 However, plaintiffs still encounter
problems recovering under the doctrine and attribute the problems
to a lack of jury understanding of the complexities of the
doctrine.' In an attempt to clarify the doctrine for the jury, many
plaintiff attorney's developed jury instructions patterned after the
2
Restatement section 323(a), the basis of the cause of action.

115. Sherer, 334 S.E.2d at 285.
116. Id. at 284. In Sherer, the victim complained of abdominal pain and a
swollen testicle. Id. The symptoms were later diagnosed as a torsion of the

testicle, a condition that ultimately led to its removal. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 285.
121. Id.
122. See Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209-10 (reiterating the elements of medical
negligence as a background for introduction of the loss of chance doctrine and

how it fits into the elements of medical negligence).
123. See generally cases cited supra note 7 (applying the lost chance doctrine
that relaxes causation where the plaintiff experiences a lost chance of survival
or effective treatment as a result of a doctor's negligence). See also White,
supra note 1, at 957-58 (summarizing the elements of medical negligence and
identifying the issue in lost chance cases as cause in fact).
124. See generally cases cited supra note 7 (requesting instructions for loss of
chance and subsequently being refused by the respective trial court). The
juries denied recovery to the plaintiffs in each case where the court refused to

issue the instruction to the jury. Id.
125. Id. (illustrating cases where the plaintiff requested a jury instruction
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The plaintiffs in these situations then encounter another
problem; because Illinois follows a system of pattern jury
instructions, Illinois trial courts generally do not give proposed
non-pattern instructions to the jury. 12 6 Certainly it is apparent that
the current pattern jury instructions do technically state the law
of proximate cause. However, to an average jury member, the law
is not so simple to understand.
Proximate cause in a medical malpractice case is generally
proven if the plaintiff can establish to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the defendant caused the plaintiffs
injury.127 This means that the plaintiff must prove that it was more
128
likely than not that the defendant's negligence caused the injury.
In lost chance cases, where the injury is a loss of chance of
survival, the plaintiff must establish that it was more likely than
not that the defendant caused the loss of chance. 19 Technically, the
plaintiff still must prove traditional proximate cause, which is why
the Illinois courts have not allowed additional instructions
for loss
1 0
of chance. Technically, the instruction is adequate.
The instructions generally state that the plaintiff has the
burden to prove to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that
the defendant was negligent and that his negligence caused the
injury for which the plaintiff is seeking recovery."" However, the
IPI do not mention the doctrine of lost chance. This forces the jury

specially dealing with loss of chance and the relaxed form of proximate cause).
See also Deitchman, supra note 21, at 242 (noting that the standard for
proximate cause in lost chance cases was borrowed from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court who relied on the Restatement Second of Torts).
126. See generally Curry, 483 N.E.2d at 716-720 (refusing to give a jury
instruction based upon section 323(a) of the Restatement of Torts). See also
cases cited supra note 58 (noting that instructions that are not a part of the
pattern instructions in Illinois will generally be refused).
127. See generally cases cited supra note 7 (utilizing the lost chance doctrine
that relaxes causation where the plaintiff experiences a lost chance of survival
or effective treatment as a result of a doctor's negligence). See also White,
supra note 1, at 957-58 (summarizing the elements of medical negligence and
identifying the issue in lost chance cases as cause in fact).
128. See cases cited supra note 58 (stating that in order to meet its burden of
proof, plaintiffs must demonstrate the elements of its medical malpractice
cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence - a more probable than not
standard).
129. Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 447. Although the plaintiffs instruction
accurately stated the law in lost chance medical malpractice cases, the trial
court was required by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(a) to use the IPI
instruction wherever applicable. Id. at 449. See also Snelson, 745 N.E.2d at
150-51 (citing Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239). For the text of the rule see
ILL S. CT. R. 239(a) supra note 52 (stating the rule for jury instructions in
Illinois medical malpractice cases).
130. ILL S. CT. R. 239(a)
131. See generally cases cited supra note 58 (giving the court the text of the
jury instruction and the general reasons for proposing the instruction).

The John Marshall Law Review

[36:249

to figure out the doctrine of lost chance doctrine on their own. 131
Courts do not apply the doctrine of lost chance in every
medical malpractice case.'33 There are only certain situations
where the judge makes a preliminary determination that the
doctrine applies and that the plaintiff may present evidence
supporting a loss of chance to the jury.' The trial court should
only give the corresponding instruction in those situations.
When the trial court allows the evidence to support a theory
of recovery under the doctrine of lost chance, the jury may be
confused about what to do with that evidence if it is given no
direction. An instruction for loss of chance would allow the jury to
more fully understand how to apply the evidence presented in each
case. 135
Other courts recognizing the cause of action for the doctrine of
lost chance allow corresponding jury instructions out of necessity
and fairness. 136 The cause of action for the doctrine of lost chance
in Illinois is patterned after the Restatement Second of Torts
section 323(a). 137 Iowa, Montana, South Carolina and Pennsylvania
132. See generally, ILLINOIS PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS FOR JURIES, 2001 ed.

(setting forth the instructions lawyer should use in presenting their theories of
action to juries in Illinois).
133. Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209. The lost chance in medical malpractice
cases relate to the injury suffered by the plaintiff "whose medical providers are
alleged to have negligently deprived the plaintiff of a chance to survive or
recover from a health problem, or where the malpractice has lessened the
effectiveness of treatment or increased the risk of an unfavorable outcome to
the plaintiff." Id.
134. See generally cases cited supra note 126 (reiterating the fact that loss of
chance will not be applied in every medical malpractice situation).
135. But see Sinclair, 758 N.E.2d at 449 (holding, contrary of the previously
stated proposition, that juries should not receive special jury instructions).
The Sinclair case is a perfect example of why trial courts should give the
doctrine of lost chance instruction to the jury. See textual discussion and
corresponding cases supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text (discussing the
Sinclair case's factual history and the court's findings).
136. See Snelson, 745 N.E.2d at 151 (according to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 239(a) and the interpretation of the rule the trial court should not
"tinker" with IPI instructions). See also cases cited supra notes 54-55 (relating
why Illinois courts favor IPI when they adequately state the law of the case).
137. See Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209 (recognizing a cause of action for loss of
chance that relaxes the proximate cause element so that the plaintiff need not
show that her chance of survival prior to the defendant's negligence would
have been greater than fifty percent). In Illinois prior to 1997 and the Holton
decision, the plaintiff needed to prove each element by a preponderance of the
evidence, which meant that the plaintiff would have to show that her chance
of survival or a better outcome was more than fifty percent. See generally id.;
Meck, 695 N.E.2d at 1325-26. For the text of the Restatement, see section 323
supra note 11. The section was first applied in Northern Trust v. Weiss
Memorial Hospital, 493 N.E.2d 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986). In Northern
Trust, the court stated that evidence showing negligent delay in diagnosis or
treatment lessened the effectiveness of treatment is sufficient to establish
proximate cause. Id. at 12.
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courts base the cause of action for the doctrine of lost chance on
section 323(a). 8 Those states allow a jury instruction for loss of
chance. Each one of those courts stated that the rationale for the
instruction is the concept that each party is entitled to have the
jury hear their theory of the case."'
The courts in other states allowing a cause of action for the
doctrine of lost chance discovered that where the doctrine of lost
chance applies, the trial court should give a corresponding
instruction to the jury. Each court found a need for the instruction
in order to alleviate the confusion presented to the jury who is
unsure how to interpret and use the evidence presented. 4 ° The
courts determined that as long as the doctrine of lost chance
doctrine applies prima facially and the instruction accurately
stated the law of the14 state, the trial court should give the
instruction to the jury. '

Every party has a right to have a jury or finder of fact hear its
theory of the case. In situations where the plaintiffs theory for
recovery lies under the doctrine of lost chance, the plaintiff has a
right to present evidence in support of the theory and also has the
right to have a jury instruction to explain to the jurors how they
are to use that evidence. Denying jury instructions that clarify the
law effectively denies parties the right to be heard.
In Illinois, parties have the same right to have a jury hear
their theory of the case.'

Even if the instruction that the court

gives is technically adequate it essentially deprives the party of
her right to be heard. Technically adequate statements of law in
lost chance cases fail to serve the purpose for which they were
created if the end result is deprivation of the chance for informed
jury deliberation. 4 3 The Illinois pattern instructions on proximate
138. See generally Sanders, 421 N.W.2d at 521-23; DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d
at 134-38; Aashiem, 695 P.2d at 827-28; Jones, 431 A.2d at 923-25; Clark, 525
A.2d at 379-84; Brozana, 454 A.2d at 1127-28; Hoeke, 445 A.2d at 143-46;
Bashline, 307 A.2d at 61-63; Sherer, 334 S.E.2d at 284-286 (each recognizing a
cause of action for loss of chance and the need for a corresponding jury
instruction).
139. See cases cited supra notes 7 and 54-55 (noting that the reasoning for
the administration for jury instructions is the same in the states that allow
instructions for loss of chance as the reasoning for tendering instructions in
Illinois).
140. See cases cited supra notes 7 and 54-55 (stating that juries will
generally be instructed on the applicable law so long as the tendered

instructions are not confusing or misleading in their choice of wording).
141. See cases cited supra notes 7 and 54-55 (noting that this is the approach

that Illinois courts take when a non-pattern instruction is not available on a
particular issue).
142. See generally Demos, 740 N.E.2d at 15-21; Erikson, 535 N.E.2d at 48182 (stating that parties are entitled to jury instructions that apply to the
relevant issues of their case).
143. See cases cites supra note 7 (denying recovery to plaintiffs where loss of
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cause may be technically adequate, however, they do not serve to
clarify in loss of chance
cases. Rather, they only serve to further
44
confuse the jury. 1
To allow for an instruction on lost chance will not harm the
defendant, as it is a true and accurate statement of the law. 145 The
plaintiff in lost chance cases does not ask the trial court for an
unfair advantage. Parties using the doctrine of lost chance merely
ask the court to provide the jury with an accurate statement of the
law of lost chance as it is applied in Illinois.
Because of the need for an instruction as demonstrated in
other cases that apply the doctrine of lost chance and the right for
parties to have the jury hear their theory of their case, parties in
Illinois seeking to use the doctrine of lost chance should be entitled
to a corresponding instruction. Since Illinois courts do not allow
non-pattern instructions that state the law of lost chance, the
court should adopt a pattern instruction for loss of chance cases to
clarify the law of the new doctrine.
V. CONCLUSION

The theory of loss of chance is relatively new and still causes
confusion in many states. In the states that have adopted the
doctrine, confusion exists as to whether the parties are then
entitled to a corresponding jury instruction. In Illinois where a
system of pattern instructions is in place, instructions that are not
a part of the pattern instructions are generally not given. Illinois
courts will only give non-pattern instructions if the pattern
instructions fail to adequately state the law and are not confusing
to the jury. Because the pattern instructions in Illinois do
technically state the law of Illinois, Illinois courts do not give nonpattern instructions for cases involving the doctrine lost chance.
In other states where that cause of action for loss of chance is
recognized under the same Restatement Second of Torts section as
in Illinois, those courts use corresponding instructions including
the language of the section out of necessity and fairness. Illinois
should follow the trend of these states by either allowing
instructions for the doctrine of lost chance or approving a pattern
instruction for the loss of chance doctrine.

chance instructions were not tendered).

144. See cases cited supra note 7 (showing that where instructions are not
given, plaintiffs do not recover). See cases cited supra notes 54-55 (analyzing

the outcome of cases where instructions on loss of chance were not given
compared to the outcomes of cases where the instruction was given).
145. See Holton, 679 N.E.2d at 1209 (noting that instructions that are given

are accurate statements of the law which in no way harm the defendant or
cause undue prejudice).

